AO-18 Threat modelling (STRIDE: spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, elevation of privilege)
Identifies security threats using six categories mapped to security properties, producing a list of threats by category.
What it does
Identifies security threats by six categories mapped to security properties. Artefact: a list of threats by category.
When to use it
Use when a user asks what could go wrong with the security of a system and wants a structured checklist to find threats.
When it does not fit
Not established in the notes.
Result format
The result is a list of security threats grouped under the six STRIDE categories, with each threat tied to the security property it breaches. Every category appears in the list, including any with no threat found.
Requirements on the material
| Property | Requirement type | Requirement |
|---|---|---|
| Content type | Always applies | requires=text |
| Unit of analysis | Always applies | requires=topic |
| Appraises source credibility | Applies in some cases | no |
Not restricted on: Structure, Variable types, Time structure, How the sample was chosen, Level of detail available, Number of sources, Whether sources can be joined, Amount of material, Known data problems, Producer interest, Source dependence, Origin, Document genre, Language, Personal information, Security classification, Licence.
| Minimum material | A description of the system components and data flows. Data flow diagrams are the usual input, but this is unconfirmed. |
|---|---|
| Additional sources needed | none |
| Not for (rules) | none |
| Not for (text) | The notes establish no fit test. Treat as the wrong choice when the system has no described components or data flows to attach threats to. |
Choosing and ordering
| Kind of technique | Primary technique, runs in step 5.3 |
|---|---|
| Phase tag | analyse |
| Other phase tags | none |
| Kind of finding | risk |
| Question answered | what |
| Strongest statement it supports | describe |
| Needs as input |
|
| Makes as output |
|
| Must exist first | None |
| Loop target | return to gather |
Library checks by stakes
Each stakes level includes the checks of the level below it. Checks that need a person apply at high stakes only, so the process leaves them out at lower stakes (decision 38). Repeatability: judgement dependent.
| Stakes | Check | Person involved | Counts as a different method |
|---|---|---|---|
| exploratory | spot check | optional | no |
| decision-informing | spot check | optional | no |
| decision-informing | human review sample | needed; left out below high stakes | no |
| decision-informing | source-span citation | none | no |
| high-stakes | spot check | optional | no |
| high-stakes | human review sample | needed | no |
| high-stakes | source-span citation | none | no |
| high-stakes | expert review | needed | no |
| high-stakes | independent review | needed | no |
Failure modes and limits
| Model suitability | model alone |
|---|---|
| Typical model failure | Lists generic threats for each of the six categories without tying them to a component or data flow of the system described. |
| Error sources | input data; language model; coder or rater judgement |
| Certainty limits | Certainty drops because the source gives no inputs, outputs or limits, and when the system description is incomplete (indirectness). |
Related techniques
- pairs with AO-17 Bow-tie analysis: barriers can be mapped for each threat found
- pairs with CH-05 Red team analysis (red team, red cell): an adversary view tests which threats are realistic
Evidence and tag basis
Documented. Developed at Microsoft by Garg and Kohnfelder; the page gives no inputs, outputs or limits. (Wikipedia, STRIDE model)
Tag basis: input profile inference; selection inference; sequencing inference; robustness inference. All tag values are inference unless a source is named.