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TC1-03 Fault tree analysis Also serves: Assess actors, options and risks.

Works downward from one undesired top event through AND and OR gates to produce a gate tree with minimal cut sets.

Trace cause and test claimsEvidence: DocumentedPrimary technique, runs in step 5.3Strongest statement: show a link between things

What it does

Starts from one undesired top event and works downward through AND and OR gates to the combinations of lower events that cause it. Artefact: a gate tree with minimal cut sets; read short cut sets and single points of failure.

When to use it

Use when one specific failure or bad outcome must be traced to the combinations of lower events that could cause it.

When it does not fit

Important failures cannot be placed in the tree, or the top event is too broad for one tree. It is weaker than failure mode and effects analysis for listing all initiating faults.

Result format

The result is a gate tree that starts from one top event and shows the AND and OR gates down to the lower events. It lists the minimal cut sets, and it names the short cut sets and any single points of failure.

Requirements on the material

PropertyRequirement typeRequirement
Content typeAlways appliesrequires=text; requires=tabular
Unit of analysisAlways appliesrequires=topic
Appraises source credibilityApplies in some casesno

Not restricted on: Structure, Variable types, Time structure, How the sample was chosen, Level of detail available, Number of sources, Whether sources can be joined, Amount of material, Known data problems, Producer interest, Source dependence, Origin, Document genre, Language, Personal information, Security classification, Licence.

Minimum materialOne precisely defined top event and system knowledge of the lower events. Failure rates are needed only to compute probabilities.
Additional sources needednone
Not for (rules)none
Not for (text)Wrong choice when important failures cannot be placed in the tree or the top event is too broad for one tree. It is weaker than failure mode and effects analysis for listing all initiating faults.

Choosing and ordering

Kind of techniquePrimary technique, runs in step 5.3
Phase taganalyse
Other phase tagsnone
Kind of findingcause; risk
Question answeredwhy
Strongest statement it supportsshow a link between things
Needs as input
Makes as output
Must exist firstNone
Loop targetreturn to frame

Library checks by stakes

Each stakes level includes the checks of the level below it. Checks that need a person apply at high stakes only, so the process leaves them out at lower stakes (decision 38). Repeatability: judgement dependent.

StakesCheckPerson involvedCounts as a different method
exploratoryassumption and limitation statementnoneno
decision-informingassumption and limitation statementnoneno
decision-informingalternative explanations checknoneno
decision-informingcode execution for arithmeticnoneno
high-stakesassumption and limitation statementnoneno
high-stakesalternative explanations checknoneno
high-stakescode execution for arithmeticnoneno
high-stakessecond technique with different assumptionsnoneconditional
high-stakesexpert reviewneededno

Failure modes and limits

Model suitabilityhuman judgement required
Typical model failureLeaves out common-cause failures and treats listed events as independent when multiplying their probabilities.
Error sourcesinput data; statistical assumptions; expert opinion
Certainty limitsCertainty drops when failure data are missing or taken from other systems, when events are not independent, or when the top event is too broad (indirectness and imprecision).

Evidence and tag basis

Documented. Described, with standards named on the page. (Wikipedia, Fault tree analysis)

Tag basis: input profile inference; selection inference; sequencing inference; robustness inference. All tag values are inference unless a source is named.