TC1-03 Fault tree analysis Also serves: Assess actors, options and risks.
Works downward from one undesired top event through AND and OR gates to produce a gate tree with minimal cut sets.
What it does
Starts from one undesired top event and works downward through AND and OR gates to the combinations of lower events that cause it. Artefact: a gate tree with minimal cut sets; read short cut sets and single points of failure.
When to use it
Use when one specific failure or bad outcome must be traced to the combinations of lower events that could cause it.
When it does not fit
Important failures cannot be placed in the tree, or the top event is too broad for one tree. It is weaker than failure mode and effects analysis for listing all initiating faults.
Result format
The result is a gate tree that starts from one top event and shows the AND and OR gates down to the lower events. It lists the minimal cut sets, and it names the short cut sets and any single points of failure.
Requirements on the material
| Property | Requirement type | Requirement |
|---|---|---|
| Content type | Always applies | requires=text; requires=tabular |
| Unit of analysis | Always applies | requires=topic |
| Appraises source credibility | Applies in some cases | no |
Not restricted on: Structure, Variable types, Time structure, How the sample was chosen, Level of detail available, Number of sources, Whether sources can be joined, Amount of material, Known data problems, Producer interest, Source dependence, Origin, Document genre, Language, Personal information, Security classification, Licence.
| Minimum material | One precisely defined top event and system knowledge of the lower events. Failure rates are needed only to compute probabilities. |
|---|---|
| Additional sources needed | none |
| Not for (rules) | none |
| Not for (text) | Wrong choice when important failures cannot be placed in the tree or the top event is too broad for one tree. It is weaker than failure mode and effects analysis for listing all initiating faults. |
Choosing and ordering
| Kind of technique | Primary technique, runs in step 5.3 |
|---|---|
| Phase tag | analyse |
| Other phase tags | none |
| Kind of finding | cause; risk |
| Question answered | why |
| Strongest statement it supports | show a link between things |
| Needs as input |
|
| Makes as output |
|
| Must exist first | None |
| Loop target | return to frame |
Library checks by stakes
Each stakes level includes the checks of the level below it. Checks that need a person apply at high stakes only, so the process leaves them out at lower stakes (decision 38). Repeatability: judgement dependent.
| Stakes | Check | Person involved | Counts as a different method |
|---|---|---|---|
| exploratory | assumption and limitation statement | none | no |
| decision-informing | assumption and limitation statement | none | no |
| decision-informing | alternative explanations check | none | no |
| decision-informing | code execution for arithmetic | none | no |
| high-stakes | assumption and limitation statement | none | no |
| high-stakes | alternative explanations check | none | no |
| high-stakes | code execution for arithmetic | none | no |
| high-stakes | second technique with different assumptions | none | conditional |
| high-stakes | expert review | needed | no |
Failure modes and limits
| Model suitability | human judgement required |
|---|---|
| Typical model failure | Leaves out common-cause failures and treats listed events as independent when multiplying their probabilities. |
| Error sources | input data; statistical assumptions; expert opinion |
| Certainty limits | Certainty drops when failure data are missing or taken from other systems, when events are not independent, or when the top event is too broad (indirectness and imprecision). |
Related techniques
- pairs with AO-16 Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA): failure mode and effects analysis lists initiating faults that a tree built from the top event can miss
- pairs with AO-17 Bow-tie analysis: a bow-tie adds barriers and consequences to the same causal paths
Evidence and tag basis
Documented. Described, with standards named on the page. (Wikipedia, Fault tree analysis)
Tag basis: input profile inference; selection inference; sequencing inference; robustness inference. All tag values are inference unless a source is named.